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I must confess that I have not found it easy to decide upon 
a suitable subject for this address. My chief difficulty was that 
it seemed to me to be hardly in keeping with an occasion such as 
this to give a purely technical lecture on some specific legal topic; 
such a lecture would be of little or no interest to laymen. At 
the same time it seemed that the occasion demanded more than 
a merely popular talk about law in general; such a talk would be 
of little or no interest to lawyers. After considering and dis­
carding various possible topics I at last thought of the present 
one, which I hope will enable me to effect a reasonable com­
promise between a popular talk and a technical lecture. More­
over, the subject has the merit of throwing some light on the 
kind of problems we deal with in the department of law. I 
regard this as an important consideration because I think that 
perhaps the chief function of an inaugural lecture—assuming, 
without deciding, as judges are wont to say, that it is something 
more than a mere professorial initiation ceremony—is to give 
one’s colleagues and the general public some idea of the nature 
of the work that is done in one’s department. I feel this is 
particularly desirable in my own case because the average layman 
probably knows less about the activities of the law department 
than about those of any other department in the University. My 
experience has been that the ordinary man doesn’t want to know 
anything about the law—all that he wants is that it should leave 
him alone. In any case, even if he did want to learn something 
about it he would have the greatest difficulty in finding out, 
because there are very few books on law for the layman.
What I propose then to do this evening is to examine some 
cases in which the bounds of liability for negligence have been 
extended. Before proceeding to do so, however, I think it 
advisable to explain, or perhaps I should say, attempt to explain, 
very briefly what is meant in law by negligence.
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Negligence has been defined as the absence of due care in 
the circumstances. Another definition is conduct involving an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others. This latter definition is 
perhaps preferable because it emphasises the fact that negligence 
is an objective, not a subjective conception. Courts of law are 
not concerned with heedlessness or inadvertence as such, but 
only with their external manifestations in conduct. As Sir 
Frederick Pollock has said:1 — “The question for judges and 
juries is not what a man was thinking about, expecting or not 
expecting, but whether his behaviour was or was not such as we 
demand of a prudent man in the circumstances.”
But neither of these definitions is adequate because both 
omit an essential requirement, namely the existence of a legal 
duty to use care. There can be no negligence in the absence of 
a duty to exercise diligence. Moreover the duty must have been 
owed to the plaintiff; it is not enough that it was owed to some­
one else. This requirement constitutes an important restriction 
on the incidence of liability for negligence. It means that 
negligence is a relative and not an absolute conception; it means, 
in other words, that the same act may be negligent with reference 
to one person but not negligent with reference to another, 
because in the particular circumstances a duty of care may have 
been owed to the former but not to the latter.
To give a cause of action for negligence there must have 
been a breach of the duty and damage suffered by the plaintiff in 
consequence thereof. It will be seen, therefore, that negligence 
is a complex conception involving three elements: (1) a duty of 
care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that 
duty, and (3) resultant damage to the plaintiff.
It is not necessary to examine these elements at length. For 
the purpose of this lecture it is sufficient to state that the test 
ordinarily applied by the Courts for determining whether a duty 
of care existed is the foresight and judgment of a reasonable 
man: Would a reasonable man situated in the same circum­
stances as the defendant have foreseen the danger of injury to 
the plaintiff, or a person in the position of the plaintiff, and 
guarded against it? If the Court is of the opinion that this 
question must be answered in the negative, then no duty existed 
and that is the end of the matter. If, however, the Court 
considers that the question must be answered in the affirmative, 
then a duty existed and the further question arises: Was there a 
breach of that duty? Here again the reasonable man is the 
criterion. The law does not require a person to take every 
possible precaution against causing harm to others, but only such 
precautions as a reasonable man would take. It will be seen
1 L a w  o f  T o r ts , 15 th  e d i tio n , 336.
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that in both cases the test is an objective one, although in both 
cases the circumstances, as known to the defendant, are, of 
course, relevant to the inquiry.
It will also be seen that in both cases the test is an elastic 
one. It is left to the judge, guided of course by any previous 
relevant decisions, to decide what the reasonable man would have 
had in contemplation and what precautions he would have taken. 
“Here”, as an eminent judge has said, “there is room for diversity
of view.........what to one judge may seem far fetched may seem
to another both natural and probable.”
As regards the third element, namely damage to the plaintiff, 
it is sufficient to state that to ground an action for negligence it 
is essential for the plaintiff to prove that he has suffered some 
pecuniary loss, actual or prospective.
Although this is a very cursory statement of the principles 
governing liability for negligence, I trust it will serve as a 
sufficient preface to what follows. After all, as that great English 
Judge, Lord Wright, once observed2 “it is possible to put the 
principle of negligence in a nutshell”, though it must be conceded 
that he added, “but it is difficult to keep it there.” What I have 
said may not exemplify the truth of the former part of this 
epigram, but I think that what follows will amply illustrate the 
truth of the latter.
The cases which I propose to discuss fall into three classes. 
The first class consists of what are commonly referred to as 
“rescue cases”, the second raises the question of liability for the 
infliction of nervous shock, and the third the question of liability 
for damage caused not by acts but by words. As I shall refer 
frequently to English, and occasionally to American, cases, I 
should perhaps mention that the Anglo-American law of 
negligence is essentially the same as our own.
Dealing first with the rescue cases, as the name indicates, 
these cases raise the question whether a person who has suffered 
injury in rescuing or attempting to rescue another from a situa­
tion of imminent danger can recover from the person who 
negligently created it. There would appear to be no South 
African cases in which this question has arisen. There are, how­
ever, a number of English cases.
Brandon v. Osborne, Garrett & Co.’' may be regarded as the 
starting point of the doctrine of the rescue cases. The plaintiff 
and her husband were customers in a shop. Owing to the 
negligence of one of the defendants’ servants who was repairing 
a skylight, some glass fell from it and struck the plaintiff’s
2 G lasgow  C o rp o ra t io n  v . M u ir  [1943] A .C . a t  462.
3 [1924J 1 K .B . 548.
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husband. The plaintiff herself was not hit, but believing her 
husband to be in serious danger she instinctively clutched him by 
the arm to pull him away and in doing so injured her leg. It was 
held she was entitled to damages.
Haynes v. Harwood,' a decision of the Court of Appeal and 
now the leading case on the subject, carried the doctrine much 
further. The defendant negligently left a two-horse van 
unattended in a crowded street. A mischievous boy threw a 
stone at the horses which caused them to bolt. The plaintiff, a 
policeman, saw from a police station what was happening, dashed 
out and at great risk to himself seized the offside horse and 
stopped them both. Unfortunately one of the horses fell on him 
and caused him serious injuries. Had the horses not been stopped 
a woman and some children in the street would probably have 
been injured. It was argued that as the plaintiff had deliberately 
assumed the risk of injury, he was debarred from recovering on 
the principle of volenti non fit injuria. In support of this 
argument counsel for the defendant relied strongly on a dictum 
of Scrutton L.J. in Cutler v. United Dairies, L td f  In that 
case the learned Lord Justice expressed the view that a spectator 
who was injured in stopping a runaway horse in a street would 
have no cause of action, because not being under any duty to do 
so the damage must be on his own head and not on the owner of 
the horse. The Court did not accept this view and held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to recover. Maughan L.J. said:6—“In 
deciding whether such a rescuer is justified in putting himself into 
a position of such great peril, the law has to measure the interests 
which he sought to protect and the other interests involved. We 
have all heard of the reasonable man whom the law postulates 
in certain circumstances; the reasonable man here must be 
endowed with qualities of energy and courage, and he is not to 
be deprived of a remedy because he has in a marked degree a 
desire to save human life when in peril.” It may be mentioned 
that, as later cases show, no significance is to be attached to the 
fact that the plaintiff was a policeman and might therefore be 
considered to be under a duty to intervene.
Haynes vs. Harwood may be regarded as the charter of all 
courageous persons who are willing to risk their lives to save 
others from death or serious bodily injury. But what is the 
position where a person incurs risks not for the purpose of saving 
human life but merely to save property? This question first 
arose in the Scottish case of Steel vs. Glasgow Iron and Steel 
Co.,1 and subsequently in Hyett vs. G. W. Railway.' In both
• [1935] 1 K .B . 146 (C .A .) .
1 [1933] 2 K .B . 297 (C .A .).
• A t  162.
T [1 9 4 4 | S.C . 237.
• [1948] 1 K .B . 345 (C .A .).
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cases the question was answered in the affirmative. In the former 
case the plaintiff, who was a guard in a goods train belonging to 
the defendants, was injured in an attempt to avert a collision 
between the train and some waggons which, through the 
negligence of the defendants, had run away. The Court
(Lord MacKay dissenting) held that, although the plaintiff's 
claim was a novel one, he was nevertheless entitled to 
recover. In the opinion of the majority there was no ground 
upon which any distinction could be made between the rescue of 
human life and the rescue of property, save that he who under­
takes a risk merely to rescue property is under a heavier onus to 
show that he acted reasonably than he who puts himself in peril 
to rescue human life.
In Hyett’s case the plaintiff was on the defendant’s premises 
when, through the negligence of the defendant, a fire broke out 
which was likely to cause serious damage to property belonging 
to the defendant. It was held that the plaintiff, who was injured 
in attempting to extinguish the fire, could recover. The judgments 
make something of.the point that the plaintiff was lawfully on 
the defendant’s premises at the time, but it is submitted that this 
consideration is irrelevant and that the true view is that just as 
anyone may intervene to save human life, so anyone may inter­
vene to save property. It must always be remembered, how­
ever, that to entitle the rescuer in either case to damages, he must 
show that his intervention was reasonable and such as might 
reasonably have been within the contemplation of the wrongdoer.
One further point may be mentioned: Does it make any 
difference that the person rescued was the person who created 
the danger? Suppose, for example, that I am staying on holiday 
at a seaside resort and bathe at a spot where lifesavers on the 
beach have warned me that it is dangerous to bathe. I get into 
difficulties and a lifesaver suffers injury in saving me. I do not 
think there can be any doubt that he could hold me liable.
I pass now to the second class of cases—the nervous shock 
cases. For merely mental suffering no action based on negligence 
will lie. The question raised in these cases is whether the position 
is different where physical illness has resulted. The first important 
case in which this question arose was Victorian Railways 
Commissioners vs. Coultas." The plaintiff was being driven one 
evening by her husband in a buggy. The buggy approached a 
railway level crossing, the gates of which were closed. The 
gatekeeper opened the gate on the near side to let the buggy 
through, and then walked across the line to open the gate on the 
far side. The buggy followed and when it was almost on the
9 (1888 ), 13 A .C . 222 (P .C .) .
line a train suddenly appeared. With great presence of mind 
the plaintiff’s husband got the buggy over the line just in time, 
so that the train passed close to the buggy but did not touch it. 
As a result of the fright and shock she received the plaintiff 
became seriously ill. It was held that, although the gatekeeper 
was clearly negligent in opening the gate, the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover. The basis of the decision was that there was 
no authority for allowing a remedy in such circumstances, and 
that to do so would be to extend unduly the bounds of liability 
for negligence.
The decision was universally disapproved. No rational 
distinction can be drawn between injury caused by a direct hit 
and injury caused by a near miss. As was said in a later case, 
there is no magic in physical contact. Fortunately for the 
rational development of the law, Privy Council decisions, though 
they carry great weight, are not binding on English Courts, and 
in Dulieu vs. White10 a Divisional Court refused to follow the 
Coultas case. In that case the plaintiff was sitting behind the 
bar in her husband’s public house. Through the negligence of 
the defendant’s servant two horses which were pulling a van 
crashed into the building. In consequence the plaintiff suffered 
a nervous shock which caused her to become seriously ill. It 
was held that she was entitled to damages. In the course of his 
judgment Kennedy J. expressed the view that to give a cause of 
action the shock must have been due to immediate fear for one’s 
own safety, and not merely to fear for the safety of others.
This view was accepted in Sueltz vs. Bolttler", where it was 
held that a wife could not recover in respect of illness caused by 
the shock of seeing her husband knocked down by a motor car 
driven by the defendant in a street in Port Elizabeth. In the 
only other nervous shock case in South Africa in which damages 
have been recovered the shock was caused by fear for the 
plaintiff’s own safety. As the cases stand, therefore, the position 
in South African law is that no action will lie for nervous shock 
unless the shock was caused by fear for one’s own safety.
In England, however, there have been further developments. 
In Hambrook vs. Stokes Bros.12 the Court of Appeal disapproved 
Kennedy J.’s suggested limitation of liability. In that case the 
plaintiff’s wife suffered a nervous shock as a result of the fear 
that her three young children, from whom she had just parted in 
a steep and narrow street, would be knocked down by a runaway 
lorry which the defendant’s servant had negligently left un­
attended at the top of the street with the engine running and 
without taking proper precautions to prevent its moving. It was
10 [19011 2 K .B . 669.
11 [1914] E .D .L . 176.
12 [1926] 1 K .B . 141 (C .A .).
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held, Sargant L.J. dissenting, that the plaintiff had a good cause 
of action against the defendant. Banks, L. J., stated that he 
wished to confine his decision to cases where the facts were 
indistinguishable in principle from the facts of the present case, 
namely where the shock was due to a reasonable fear of 
immediate personal injury either to one’s self or to one’s children. 
But Atkin L.J. was prepared to go much further and said that, 
personally, he could see no reason for excluding a bystander in 
the highway who received a shock from apprehension of, or the 
actual sight of injury to, a third person. Both the majority 
judges, however, expressed the view that the plaintiff would have 
had no cause of action if the shock had resulted not from what 
the plaintiff’s wife saw or realised by her own unaided senses, 
but from what bystanders had told her.
It was generally thought that Atkin L.J.’s view went too 
far. But in Owens vs. Liverpool Corporation,13 the Court of 
Appeal went much further. There, through the negligence of the 
defendants’ servant, a tram car violently collided with a hearse 
which was proceeding along the street, broke its glass side, and 
overturned the coffin. The hearse was followed by a carriage 
containing the aged mother of the deceased, an uncle, a cousin 
and a cousin’s husband. Only the uncle saw the collision but 
the others saw the results. All of them sued for damages for 
injury resulting from nervous shock. The trial judge held that 
to found liability for shock there must be apprehension of injury 
to a human being and dismissed the actions, but the Court of 
Appeal reversed this decision. The judgment of the Court was 
delivered by Mackinnon L.J. In a passage which affords a 
good example of judicial wit and irony, he said14:—Phillimore 
J. in Dulieu vs. White & Sons, envisaged ‘an experienced and 
cool citizen, the ideal vir constans for whom epnreipla makes 
avSpeia' A man of that polyglot character might readily be 
disbelieved if he alleged that such an incident as this had caused 
him the form of illhealth which is known as shock. The present 
plaintiffs might well have been disbelieved in that assertion, but 
the learned deputy-judge believed them, and we think we must 
accept his findings of fact. It may be that the plaintiffs are of 
that class which is peculiarly susceptible to the luxury of woe at 
a funeral so as to be disastrously disturbed by any untoward 
accident to the trappings of mourning. But one who is guilty 
of negligence to another must put up with idiosyncrasies of his 
victim that increase the likelihood or extent of damage to him: it 
is no answer to a claim for a fractured skull that its owner had an 
unusually fragile one.” This statement, however, begs the 
question because it assumes that the defendants were guilty of
13 [1938] 1 K .B . 394 (C .A .).
'* A t 400.
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negligence towards the plaintiffs. This was the very question in 
issue and the answer to it depended upon whether the defendants 
owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs, which in turn depended 
upon whether the defendants should reasonably have foreseen 
injury to the plaintiffs.
Owen’s case represents the high watermark of liability for 
shock. But it can no longer be regarded as good law, for it was 
disapproved by three out of the five Law Lords who took part in the 
decision in Bourhill vs. Young.™ In that case, which is now the 
leading case on the subject, the plaintiff, a fishwife, was unloading 
her basket from the offside of a tram in a Glasgow street when 
a motor cyclist, travelling at an excessive speed, came past on the 
near side of the tram and collided with a motor car some 45 feet 
away. The cyclist was thrown on the street and sustained injuries 
from which he subsequently died. The plaintiff did not see the 
accident but the sound of the collision gave her such a shock that 
she was disabled from carrying on her business for some time 
and subsequently suffered a miscarriage. It was held that she 
had no cause of action against the deceased’s estate. The basis 
of the decision was that in determining whether a duty of care 
existed a normal standard of susceptibility must be taken and 
that, in the circumstances, the cyclist, or, as Lord Wright pre­
ferred to put it, the reasonably hypothetical observer, could not 
reasonably have foreseen that anyone in the position in which the 
plaintiff was would be likely to be affected in the manner in 
which she was. As Lord Wright pointed out, the plaintiff merely 
heard the noise which upset her without having any definite idea 
of what it was. The correctness of the decision in Hambrook’s 
case was left open: Lord Wright expressly approved it; Lord 
Porter impliedly approved it; Lord Russell disapproved it and 
Lords Thankerton and McMillan reserved their opinions.
The only nervous shock case of importance subsequent to 
Bourhill’s case is King v. Phillips.™ In that case the driver of a 
taxicab negligently backed it into a small child who was on a 
tricycle immediately behind him, thereby slightly injuring the 
child. The child’s mother was in her house seventy yards away 
and while looking out of a window heard a scream which she 
identified as that of the child. She saw the cab backing into the 
tricycle and then saw the tricycle under the cab, but she could 
not see the child. She ran into the road, met the child and took 
him indoors. As a result of what she had heard and seen she 
suffered a shock which affected her health. It was held that she 
could not recover. Hodson L.J. disapproved the views expressed 
by the majority judges in Hambrook’s case, and based his 10
10 [1943] A .C. 92 (H .L .) .
«  [1953] 1 Q .B. 429 (C .A .).
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judgment on the short ground that liability for shock is limited 
to cases where the plaintiff has been put in reasonable fear of 
immediate personal injury to himself. Singleton and Denning 
LL.J. on the other hand, considered that Hambrook’s case had 
been correctly decided, but the former was of opinion that the 
trial judge’s findings of fact that in the circumstances no damage 
of any kind could reasonably have been anticipated should not be 
upset, and the latter took the view that the damage suffered by 
the plaintiff was too remotely connected with the negligence of 
the driver of the taxi to give a cause of action.
As the cases stand, then, the position in regard to liability 
for nervous shock may be summarised as follows:
(1) There can be no liability for the infliction of shock, 
either in South African or in English Law, unless in the 
circumstances a reasonable man would have foreseen 
the risk of injury to the plaintiff and guarded against it.
(2) According to both South African and English law a 
person may be liable for a shock caused by fear for his 
own safety.
(3) As the cases stand in South Africa liability does not 
extend beyond this.
(4) The position in English Law is uncertain. There is 
authority for the view that liability may extend to 
shock caused by fear for the safety of one’s immediate 
family, e.g. of a child, a parent, a husband or a wife. 
On the other hand it is unlikely that liability extends to 
shock caused by fear for the safety of a stranger.
What should the position be? This is a very difficult 
question, so difficult that one hesitates to express an opinion. 
Personally, however, I incline to the view that expediency 
requires that liability should be limited to cases where the shock 
was caused by immediate fear for the plaintiff’s own safety. If 
this limitation is not recognised one is faced with problems of 
almost insuperable difficulty. For example, there would seem to 
be no logical reason for imposing liability in Hambrook’s case 
but denying it in King’s case. Moreover, what is one to say 
about the Australian case of Clark vs. IV aver ley Municipality.” 
There a Municipality dug a deep trench in a street and neglected 
adequately to fence it. Heavy rains filled the trench with water. 
When the plaintiff’s young son, aged seven, failed one day to 
return home at the usual hour, the plaintiff went to search for 
him. The search lasted several hours. The plaintiff was present 
when the trench was dragged and the body of her son recovered. 
She suffered a severe nervous shock which affected her health.
17 (19391, 62 C .L .R . 17.
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By a majority, Evatt J. vigorously dissenting, the High Court of 
Australia held that the Municipality was not liable to the plaintiff.
I think therefore that there is a strong case for confining 
liability to shock due to immediate fear for one’s own safety, and 
that the arguments for doing so could not be better put than in 
the following passage from the judgment of Wickem J. in the 
American case of Waube vs-. Warrington18, where the facts were 
almost identical with those in King’s case:
“It was suggested in the dissenting opinion in the 
Iiambrook case that if the mother may recover, why not a 
a child whose shock was occasioned by the peril of the 
mother. It is not necessary to multiply these illustrations. 
They can be made as numerous as the varying degrees of 
human relationship, and they shade into each other in such 
a way as to leave no definite or clear-cut stopping place for 
the suggested doctrine, short of a recovery for every person 
who has sustained physical injuries as a result of shock or 
emotional distress by reason of seeing or hearing of the 
peril or injury of another. No Court has gone this far, and 
we think no Court should go this far. It is our view that 
fairness and justice, as well as expediency, require the 
defendant’s duty to be [confined to shock caused by fear for 
the plaintiff’s own safety] . . . .  Human wrongdoing is seldom 
limited in its injurious effects to the immediate actors in a 
particular event. More frequently than not a chain of 
results is set up that visits evil consequences far and wide. 
While from the standpoint of good morals and good citizen­
ship the wrongdoer may be said to violate a duty to those 
who suffer from the wrong, the law finds it necessary to 
attach practical and just limits to the legal consequences of 
the wrongful act.”
I proceed now to the third class of cases. A person may, 
of course, be under a contractual duty to use care in the making 
of statements, e.g. solicitors, accountants and stock-brokers must 
exercise care in advising their clients. But the question raised by 
these cases is whether a duty of care may exist in the absence of 
a contractual relationship between the parties.
Until the case of Perlman v. Zoutendyk13 it was generally 
assumed that in our law, as in English law, independently of 
contract, a false statement causing damage is not actionable 
unless it is fraudulent. In that case, however, it was held that a 
sworn appraiser who issues a certificate of valuation with know­
ledge that it is likely to be used for the purpose of inducing 
someone to lend money on the security of the property valued, 1*
1S (1935), 258 N .W . 497.
10 1934 C .P .D . 151.
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owes a duty of care to any person who, in fact, lends money on 
the security of the property. Watermeyer J. who delivered the 
judgment of the Court, based his conclusion on the broad ground 
that a duty of care arises wherever a person should reasonably 
have foreseen the probability of harm being caused by his acts 
to another.
The decision met with a mixed reception. Some writers 
hailed it as a great step forward in the logical extension of 
liability for negligence, but others, quorum pars parva fui, 
considered that in laying down such a sweeping principle the 
learned judge had gone too far. The latter view was confirmed by 
the decision of the Appellate Division in Herschel vs1. Mrupe20, 
which is now the leading South African case on the subject and 
perhaps the most important case on delict decided by the 
Appellate Division since its establishment. Before dealing with 
that case, however, it will be convenient to examine briefly the 
position in English and American law.
The leading case on liability for negligent statements in 
English law is Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.2 1 There the 
defendants, a firm of accountants, had by their clerk prepared a 
company’s accounts and balance sheet. To the knowledge of 
the clerk the documents were to be placed before the plaintiff to 
induce him to invest money in the company. The documents had 
been negligently prepared and did not give a true view of the 
state of the company’s affairs. Relying on their accuracy the 
plaintiff subscribed the sum of £2,000 for shares in the 
company. Shortly thereafter the company went into liquidation 
and the plaintiff lost his money. He claimed that the defendants 
were liable to compensate him for the loss he had suffered. It 
was held, Denning L.J. delivering a powerful dissenting 
judgment, that the defendants owed no duty of care to the 
plaintiff and that the action therefore failed.
It was common cause that the Court was bound by its 
previous decision in Le Lievre v. Gould12, unless that case could 
be shown to be distinguishable or to have been impliedly over­
ruled. Denning L.J. who delivered the first judgment, con­
sidered that in view of certain later House of Lords decisions the 
Court was entitled to examine afresh the law as to negligent 
statements, and held that in the circumstances the defendants 
owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise care in the preparation of 
the accounts and balance sheet. In the course of his judgment he 
mentioned three famous cases in which by a majority decision 
novel claims had been allowed, and he characterised the minority
“  1954(3) S .A . 464 (A .D .).
31 [1951] 2 K .B . 164 (C .A .) .
33 [1893] 1 Q .B. 491 (C .A .) .
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judges in these cases as “the timorous souls who were fearful of 
allowing a new cause of action” and the majority judges as “the 
bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so required.” 
To this implied charge of judicial cowardice Asquith L.J. replied 
at the close of his judgment: “I am not concerned with defending 
the existing state of the law or contending that it is strictly 
logical. It clearly is not—but I am merely recording what I 
think it is. If this relegates me to the company of ‘timorous 
souls’ I must face that consequence with such fortitude as I can 
command.”
Turning now to the American cases, in Edwards v. Lamb” 
a doctor employed by the plaintiff’s husband to treat a sore on 
his leg negligently advised the plaintiff that it was not contagious 
and that it would be safe for her to assist in dressing it. The 
plaintiff contracted her husband’s complaint. It was held that 
she had a cause of action against the doctor.
In International Products Co. v. Erie R.R. Co.23 4 the plaintiff, 
expecting a consignment of goods, asked a servant of the 
defendant where the goods would be stored on arrival. He stated 
that he required the information for the purpose of insuring the 
goods. He was told the goods would be stored in Warehouse 
“A”; in fact they were stored in Warehouse “B”. Warehouse 
“B” was burnt down and the goods destroyed. Because of the 
wrong information he had given his insurers as to the location of 
the goods, the plaintiff could not claim against them. It was 
held that the defendants were liable to compensate the plaintiff 
for the loss of the goods.
On the other hand, in the great case of Ultramares 
Corporation v. Touche25 the New York Court of Appeals, 
presided over by the famous Cardozo C.J. and perhaps the 
strongest Court that has ever sat in the United States, held that a 
person who had lent money to a company on the faith of a 
balance sheet negligently prepared by the company’s auditors 
could not recover the loss he had sustained through relying on 
the accuracy of the balance sheet. The following passage from 
the judgment of Cardozo C.J. emphasises the hardships, 
difficulties and inconveniences that would follow from an 
indiscriminate recognition of a duty to use care in the making of 
statements or the issue of certificates: “Liability for negligence if 
adjudged in this case will extend to many callings other than an 
auditor’s. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the validity 
of municipal or corporate bonds with knowledge that the opinion 
will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to 
the investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to
23 (1899), 45 A tla n t ic  R e p o r te r  480.
24 (1927 ), 56 A .L .R . 1377.
25 (1931), 255 N .Y . 170.
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the same extent as if the controversy were one between client and 
adviser. Title companies insuring titles to a tract of land, with 
knowledge that at an approaching auction the fact that they have 
insured will be stated to the bidders, will become liable to 
purchasers who may wish the benefit of a policy without payment 
of a premium. These illustrations may seem to be extreme, but 
they go little, if any, further that we are invited to go now. 
Negligence, moreover, will have one standard when viewed in 
relation to the employer, and another and at times a stricter 
standard when viewed in relation to the public. Explanations that 
might seem plausible, omissions that might be reasonable, if the 
duty is confined to the employer, conducting a business that 
presumably at least is not a fraud upon his creditors, might wear 
another aspect if an independent duty to be suspicious even of 
one’s principal is owing to investors. Everyone making a promise 
having the quality of a contract will be under a duty to the 
promisee by virtue of the promise but under another duty, apart 
from contract, to an indefinite number of potential beneficiaries 
when performance has begun. The assumption of one relation 
will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, 
inescapably hooked together. The law does not spread its 
protection so far.”
Returning to HerscheVs case the facts were that the 
plaintiff’s husband was killed in a collision between two motor 
vehicles, one of which was the defendant’s property. In reply to 
an inquiry made by the plaintiff’s attorney the defendant through 
her attorneys innocently but incorrectly informed the plaintiff 
that she was insured with a particular company. In consequence 
the plaintiff instituted action against the company in terms of 
the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 1942, and as a result incurred 
wasted costs. The plaintiff sued to recover the loss, alleging that 
the defendant had acted negligently in supplying her with 
incorrect information. It was held, Centlivres C. J. dissenting, 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
Centlivres C. J. considered that assuming, without deciding, 
that some limitations must be placed on the principle enunciated 
in Perlman’s case, there was no reason for not applying the 
principle to the present case. Each of the majority judges 
delivered a separate judgment and each of them based his 
judgment on a different ground. All of them would appear to 
recognise the necessity of restricting liability for negligent state­
ments, but as there is no agreement between them as to the 
limitations which should be imposed the case does little to clarify 
the position.
None of the judges attempts to define the limits within 
which actions for negligent statements should be confined. This 
is disappointing, but perhaps one could hardly have expected it
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to be otherwise, as judges, especially when dealing with novel 
and difficult questions, must be careful to refrain from indulging 
in generalisations which are not necessary for the decision of the 
particular case for fear of tying the hands of judges in subsequent 
cases. There is no need, however, for an academic lawyer to 
exercise such caution; in fact, I consider it to be the duty of an 
academic lawyer if he has formed views of his own on any 
difficult problem to express them. Even if they are wrong they 
may nevertheless be of some assistance in suggesting the lines 
along which the correct solution is to be sought. As Maitland 
once said, “Lecturers must sometimes rush in where judges fear 
to tread.” I propose, therefore, to state shortly my own views as 
to the limits of liability for negligent statements.
I think in the first place we must distinguish between state­
ments which, if incorrect, are likely to cause physical damage, and 
statements which, if incorrect, are likely to cause merely financial 
loss. There is some authority for recognising such a distinction 
and it seems to me to be well founded. I can see no reason why 
liability should not be imposed where a reasonable man would 
have foreseen the likelihood that a statement, if incorrect, would 
cause physical injury to person or property; as, for example, in 
the American case where the doctor negligently advised the 
plaintiff that her husband’s disease was not contagious.
As regards statements causing merely financial loss, I think 
that on grounds of social policy liability should be confined to 
cases where the plaintiff has been induced to act to his loss 
through reliance upon the correctness of a statement made to 
him by the defendant. To impose liability for a negligent state­
ment made not to the plaintiff himself but to other persons 
concerning the plaintiff in consequence of which he has suffered 
loss, would be to place too burdensome a restriction upon 
humanity. Here again there is some authority for this view.
Assuming then that liability is to be restricted to statements 
made to the plaintiff, the problem remains as to the circumstances 
in which liability should be imposed. The answer to this problem 
is bound up with the question whether any relaxation is to be 
permitted of the rule that damages are not recoverable in respect 
of an innocent misrepresentation inducing a contract. It has 
always been regarded as a fundamental principle, both of our 
own law and of the English law, that a misrepresentation which 
has induced a contract, although it may found a claim for 
rescission of the contract, will not found a claim for damages 
unless it was fraudulent. If this rule is to be adhered to, it 
follows that there can be little scope for actions for negligent 
statements, because clearly if the ordinary test of the foresight 
and judgment of a reasonable man is the criterion to be applied
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in determining liability for negligent statements, a person who 
has been induced to his loss to enter into a contract by a negligent 
misrepresentation should be entitled to recover. Should the rule 
be adhered to? I incline to the view that is should. To allow 
departures from the rule would have serious repercussions on the 
law of contract. Moreover, 1 think the rule can be justified on 
the ground that the ordinary prudent man—or at any rate the 
ordinary prudent business man, and I think here this should be 
the criterion—would consider that the representee has only 
himself to blame for any loss he may have sustained, because he 
could have protected himself by obtaining from the other party 
to the contract a contractual guarantee of the truth of the state­
ment.
If this is the true rationale of the rule it may be that we are 
close to a solution—and I think a not unreasonable solution—of 
the problem of the limits of liability for negligent statements. It 
is only a short step further to hold that no action should lie in 
respect of any negligent statement, whether made in connection 
with a contract or not, unless the plaintiff had no reasonably 
practicable means of protecting himself from any loss he might 
incur through acting in reliance upon it. If this view were 
adopted it would of course have the effect of confining liability 
for negligent statements within very narrow limits. But I think 
this is as it should be and that considerations of social policy and 
expediency require the recognition of some such limitation. As 
Schreiner J. A. observed in a recent case20: “Justice may some­
times be better served by denying a remedy than by granting 
one”. Moreover, I doubt whether the ordinary business man, in 
the absence of fraud or of any contractual relationship between 
himself and the maker of the statement, would expect any greater 
measure of protection.
It remains only to note that whether or not this view is 
correct it at least has the merit of affording a simple explanation 
of the leading cases on the subject. In Herschel's case, as is 
pointed out in the judgments, the plaintiff could easily have 
protected herself by demanding, as she was entitled under the 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act to do, the production of the 
statutory declaration of insurance. In the Ultramares case and 
in Candler’s case it would have been a simple matter for the 
plaintiff, as I think most prudent business men would have done, 
to have employed his own accountant, who would of course have 
owed him a contractual duty of care, to investigate and report 
upon the affairs of the company before lending money to it. On 
the other hand, in the Erie Railroad case the plaintiff had no real 
alternative but to rely on the information given to him by the
20 U n io n  G o v e rn m e n t v . O cean  A cc id e n t a n d  G u a ra n te e  C o rp o ra t io n , 1956(1)
S.A . a t  584.
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railway as to the warehouse in which his goods would be stored, 
and the railway was therefore rightly held liable.
That completes what I have to say on the three classes of 
cases I set out to discuss. But as this is not purely a law lecture 
but an inaugural address, before concluding, it may perhaps not 
be out of place to refer briefly to three features of the legal 
system which are well illustrated by the cases I have dealt with, 
but which are not, I think, always fully understood or appreciated 
by the layman.
The first is that the law does not consist merely of rules for 
definite situations capable of more or less mechanical application. 
It is true that it contains many such rules, e.g. the rule that you 
must drive on the left-hand side of the road, or the rule that a 
will is invalid unless attested by two witnesses, but it also includes 
many principles of general application and of varying degrees of 
flexibility, which cannot be applied by mere rule of thumb. For 
example, in applying the test of the foresight and judgment of 
the reasonable man to the facts of a particular case the Court 
has often a task of the greatest difficulty to perform, because, as 
has been pointed out, the spokesman of the reasonable man, who 
after all is merely an anthropomorphism for justice, is, and must 
be, the Court itself. The layman is apt to consider that there is 
a clear-cut rule for almost every situation and that all a judge 
has to do at the conclusion of a trial is to make up his mind on 
the facts and then, so to speak, put his hand in the appropriate 
pigeon hole, pull out the rule contained therein and apply it 
to the particular facts of the case. No doubt the reason for this 
belief is that the man in the street tends to think of law almost 
exclusively in terms of statute law and criminal law—the two 
branches of the law which are chiefly involved in the cases that 
are reported in the newspapers. So far as concerns those two 
branches of the law the man in the street’s view is to a large 
extent true. I doubt, however, whether the average layman 
realises that statute law, although it is becoming more and more 
important, forms only a small part of the body of the law. Here 
I may mention that when lawyers refer to the law—more 
particularly when they do so in laudatory terms—they have in 
mind primarily the common law, that is that part of the law 
which is founded on the Roman and Roman-Dutch law and 
which therefore does not include statute law. Lawyers are not 
responsible for what is enacted by the legislature and they are 
sometimes far from satisfied with measures that are put on the 
Statute Book, especially if, as unfortunately sometimes happens, 
they involve derogations from the rule of law. As regards the 
criminal law it forms an even smaller part of the corpus juris. 
Some idea of the proportion it bears to the rest of the law may 
be gained by looking at that monumental treatise—Halsbury’s
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Laws of England. The section on Criminal Law occupies only 
about two-thirds of one of the 34 volumes. This is perhaps 
not really surprising if one reflects that there is scarcely a 
human relationship or activity that is not regulated or affected 
in some way by the law.
The second feature which is perhaps not sufficiently realised 
is that the law is not static; it is dynamic; it is a living organism 
constantly adjusting itself •— slowly, maybe, but steadily — to 
changing economic and social conditions and to the changing 
mores of society. This is more true of course of some branches 
of the law than of others. It is especially true of the law of civil 
wrongs, that is the law of delict or tort which is the most rapidly 
developing branch of the law in every civilised country today. 
The reason for this is not far to seek: whereas a hundred years 
ago there were comparatively few ways in which one could cause 
injury to another, today in this atomic age the ways are legion. 
Mr. Justice Holmes once said that every half century the 
American case law was completely re-written so that older cases 
could be discarded. He did not of course mean by this that a 
completely new body of rules comes into existence, but that in 
the later cases the rules that have survived are to be found 
restated. This is perhaps not altogether true of South Africa 
which has a much smaller population that the United States and 
consequently much less litigation. Nevertheless I have noticed 
that whereas thirty years ago I used to refer not infrequently to 
the early Cape cases I seldom have occasion to do so today.
Finally, I think it is not always appreciated that although 
the lines along which the established principles of the law are to 
move are in the main determined by logic and analogy—and 
rightly so because if it were otherwise the affairs of men could 
not be governed by that serene and impartial uniformity which 
is an essential feature of the administration of justice according 
to law—other considerations play a part. Although an over­
statement, Holmes’ famous aphorism that “the life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been experience”, contains a large 
measure of truth. Considerations of convenience, expediency 
and policy, rather than considerations of pure logic, must often 
determine whether a principle which is logically relevant to a 
given situation should or should not be applied to it. This is 
not to be wondered at if one reflects that the aim of the law is 
not merely the achievement of logical consistency. Its aim is 
a much higher one: the achievement of justice as between man 
and man and as between the citizen and the State—a goal which 
it can never hope to reach but which it is ceaselessly striving to 
attain to. As has been well said, the function of the law is the 
eternal quest for justice—a truth that neither lawyers nor laymen 
should ever forget.
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